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-vs.-·
W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M.
LAWLER, his wife, _
Defendant, and Appellants,
-vs.WALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and Counterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff
against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
Appellant,
-vs.GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant in Intervention, and
Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S-TATE OF UTAH
EARL D. TANNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M.
LAWI~ER, his wife,
Defendant, and Appellants,
-vs.'\VALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and Counterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff
against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
Appellant,
-vs.GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant in Intervention, and
Respondent.

Case No. 8518

- BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no dispute as to the facts of this action.
The dispute is .as to the legal effect of the acts done by
the parties. Most of the- f~acts are as set forth in Appellants' Brief, however, respondents desire to dire:ct the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attention of the Court to some facts shown in the record
which are either not set forth in Appellants' Brief or
are not set forth with sufficient detail.
At the time of the Sheriff's sale of the property
involved in this dispute, there were outstanding against
said property the following liens, in addition to the
mortgage lien being foreclosed:
1. A judgment lien of Paul Clowes resulting from
a judgment against W. C. Lawler, dated !lay 28, 1954,
in the amount of $1,555.48.

2. A judgment lien of Idaho Grange Wholesale
against W. C. Lawler dated July 13, 1954, in the amount
of $441.38.
3. Federal tax lien against W. C. Lawler for the
years 1952, 1953, and 1955, in the amount of $1,412.57.
4. A Utah State Tax lien against W. C. Lawler
dated January 9, 1954, in the amount of $144.84.
5. A judgment lien of ,,. .alter H. Reichert against
"\\7 • C. La,vler dated ~lay 18, 1955, in the amount of
$4,017.20.

The facts set forth in 1, 2, 3 and 4 ,above are shown
in thP filP in Civil No. 103871. Pacific National Life
A ~sura.ne.P Co1np.any· vs. }lagana, et al. which is an exhi hit in this ea8P. but the pages of which are unnumbered. ThP facts in 5 above are shown in Stipulation of
F1act No. 23.
In thp said case of Paeific Natjonal Life Assurance
Company vs. l\lagana, elt .al, both W. C. La,vler and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Laura M. Lawler were parties defendant and answered
concerning their claims to the property being foreclosed,
which property was owned by them as joint tenants and
mortgaged by both of them to the Pacific National Life
Assurance Company. Their Answer was filed J~anuary
11, 1955, and was never amended in any particular either
before or after the Sheriff's sale. In that Answer neither
W. C. Lawler nor L.aura M. Lawler made any cl,aim to
a homestead interest in the property being foreclosed.
(See Answer of the Lawlers in the mortgage foreclosure
proceedings.)
It may be well, in the interest of clarity, to chart
the significant acts of the parties in the order of their
occurrence. Since the principal controversy concerns
acts subsequent to the foreclosure proceedings, we will
not go behind the foreclosure complaint in point of time:
December 15, 1954: Pacific National Life Assurance
Comp.any filed Complaint against W. C. and Laura
M. Lawler, et al, foreclosing mortgage.
January 11, 1955: W. C. and Laura M. Lawler answered
Complaint - no allegation of home~s,tead.
June 1, 1955: Decree and Order of Sale on Foreclosure
entered.
June 3, 1955: Notices of Sheriff's Sale po~ted and published setting time of s.ale as 12 :00 noon on July 5,
1955.
July 5, 1955: Sheriff's sale. Property purchased by
Pacific National Life Assurance Company for the
amount of the judgment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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July 6, 1955: Sheriff's Certificate of Sale issued to
Pacific National and copy recorded.

December 27, 1955: Declaration of Home-stead executed
by W. C. Lawler only (R. 22).

'

December 28, 1955: 1. Pacific National -assigned the
Sheriff's Certificate of .Sale to Walter H. Reichert
for $8,821.91, (R. 23).
2. W. C. Lawler and Walter Reichert advised by
John W. Lowe, attorney, that Earl D. Tanner was
interested in redeeming the property.

December 29, 1955: (In order of occurrence)
1. W. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler quit-claimed
property to W.alter H. Reichert and Sylvia L.
Reichert. Deed specifically includes homestead interest of grantors. (R. 24).

2. 'Valter H. Reichert exhibits Assignment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, Quit-Claim Deed, and Declaration of Homestead to Sheriff.
3. Deelaration of Hotnestead of W. C. Lawler is
recorderl, as 'veil ,as the Assignment of Sheriff's
CPrtifieate of S.ale, and La,vler-Reichert Quit-Claim
Deed.
4. E·arl D. Tanner, assignee of judgment creditor
P·aul W. (~lowes, took all steps required by statute
for rede1nption and paid Sheriff $9,078.81 for
Walter fl. Reiehert.
5. Sheriff issued Certificate of Redemption to
Earl D. Tanner, \vho recorded same.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

6. Earl D. Tanner paid delinquent taxes on property in .amount of $424.99.
January 6, 1956: Sheriff's Deed is. sued to Earl D.
Tanner, who recorded same.
.
For the bal~ance of this brief, the Plaintiff, Earl
D. Tanner will be referred to as "T~anner," the Defendant
and Intervener Walter H. Reichert will be referred to
as "Reichert" and the Defendants W. C. L.awler and
Laura M. Lawler as "the Lawlers." George Beckstead
will be referred to as "Sheriff" and Pacific National
Life Assurance Company as "Pacific National."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHEN WALTER H. REICHERT PURCHASED AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE FROM
PACIFIC NATIONAL, HE RECEIVED ALL 'THE TITLE
THAT PACIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED AS PURCHASER AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NO MORE, AND
HIS LA'TER ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED FR·OM
THE LAWLERS DID NOT 'TERMINATE THE MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND CUT OFF LIEN
CREDITORS' RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION.

POINT II
WHEN EARL D. TANNER REDEEMED THE PROPERTY FROM WALTER H. REICHERT HE R.ECEIVED ALL
THE RIGHTS THAT PA·CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED
AS PURCHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NOTHING MORE, AND THEREFORE HE RECEIVED THE TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM HOMESTEAD, BUT
SUBJECT TO REDEMPTION BY OTHER LIEN CREDITORS.
1

POINT III
THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER HAVING
BEEN SOLD BY THE SHERIFF TO PACIFIC NATIONAL
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AT THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND EARL
D. 'TANNER HAVING SUCCEEDED !TO THE TITLE OF
PACIFIC NATIONAL, THE SHERIFF WAS REQUIRED BY
LAW TO CONVEY THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER
TO EARL D. TANNER.

POINT IV
NO CREDITORS HAVING REDEEMED THE PROPERTY
FROM THE REDEMPTIONER EARL D. TANNER, HE WAS
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SHERIFF'S DEED SIX
MONTHS AFTER THE SHERIFF'S SALE.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED A MONEY
JUDGMENT AGAINST WALTER H. REICHERT.

POINT VI
THIS COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT
BELOW AND, IN ADDITION, DIRECT THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD
WALTER H. REICHERT AND THE LAWLERS HAVE CONTINUED· TO UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE PROPERTY
SINCE THE JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION.

STATEJ\IENT OF THE CASE
This is an unla\\:ful detainer action brought by
Earl D. Tanner, "--ho claims to be the owner of a ee·rtain
house and lot, against his tenants at will, W. C. Lawler
and J.~aura l\L La\\. ler, for the possession of the property and for rents and drunages. 'Valter H. Reichert
moved to intervene and beca.n1e a pa.rty to the unlawful
<lntainer artion as a defendant and counter claimant
on the g-round that he \\ras the o\\rner of the property,
po~~es,sing the same through his ten~ants, the Lawlers
(R. 12). The·re-afte·r the said Reichert stipulated that
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he was the possessor of the premises by and through
the Lawlers and that he refused to surrender the property to Siaid T·anner.
The Trial Court, the Honorable David T. Lewis
presiding, decided that the Plaintiff Tanner, was the
owner of the property, and that the Defendants Reichert
and Lawler were unlawfully detaining the same. He
awarded the Plaintiff judgment of re~srtitution, rents up
to the time set in the Notice to Quit, and damages thereafter which were, as is required by law, tripled. At the
risk of incurring judgment for additional triple damages,
the defendant Reichert still refused to surrender the
premises and posted a supersede,as bond so that the
plaintiff could not enforce his judgment of restitution.
Reichert has continued to rent the premises to the L~aw
lars and to collect rentals from them and the Lawlers,
too, enjoying the protection of the supersedeas bond,
have refused to vaeate the premises.

The issue is whether the detaining of the property
by Reichert and the Lawlers is unlawful. The answer
lies in the law of titles and in the sp-ecific fields of redemptions from mortgage foreclosure S ales and of homesteads. If the detainer of the appellants is unlawful,
the effect of that unlawful detainer is prescribed by
statute and triple damages are mandatory, not permis1

SIVe.

The basic propositions in the plaintiff's ~argument
are as follows:
1. Pacific National was the purchaser at the ·SherSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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iff's sale on a mortgage foreclosure and, as such, took
the prope-rty free and cle·ar ·of the home·ste,ad of the
Lawlers.
2. Reichert took an assignment of all the right,
title and interest of Pacific National in the Ce-rtificate
of S~ale and, so far as the Sheriff's s·ale is concerned,
stood exactly in the shoes of the Pacific N ation,al.
T·anner, complying in precise detail with the
requirements of the statute, redeemed the property
from Reichert. He redeemed by virtue of the judgment
lien on the prop·erty accruing in an action against W. C.
Lawler only.
3.

By virtue of this redemption, Tanner stood
e:x:actly in the shoes of the purchaser at the Sheriff's
s-ale, Pacific National, having all its right, title and interest in the property, free from homestead.
4.

5. No person has redeemed the property from
Tanner and the time for redemption has expired.
Tanner, having been substituted to the position
of Pacific N·ational by compliance \Yith the redemption
statutes, is the owner of the property.
6.

ARGU~1:ENT

POINT I
WHEN WALTER H. REI·CHERT PURCHASED AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE FROM
PACIFIC NATIONAL, HE RECEIVED ALL THE TITLE
THAT PA:CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED AS PUR·CHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NO MORE, AND
HIS LA'TER ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE LAWLERS DID NOT 'TERMINATE THE MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND CUT OFF LIEN
CREDI'TORS' RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION.

A discus:sion of this point requires as background a
survey ·of the law of redemption of re~al property from
mortgage foreclosure sales. Since ther·e was no common
law right of redemption after sale, the right is wholly
a cre.~ture of statute. It should be remembered that
there is a right to "redeem" property from mortgage
foreclosure by paying off the mortgage before the
she·riff's sale. That right did exist ·at common law, and
it is mentioned here solely because, in examining the
texts on real property and the reported cases, it is necessary to keep in mind that we are conce-rned with redemption after sheriff's sale. The rules and discussions
which apply to a "right to redeem" before sheriff's sale·
are different and have no applicat~on to the case at bar.
In Ut~h all rights of redemption arise under, and
are limited by, the provisions of Rule 69 (f) U.R.C.P.
(formerly § 104-37-30 et seq., U.C.A. 1943). The pertinent portions of that Rule are :
"(f) Redemption from Sale.
(1) Who May Redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold separately,
may be redeemed by the following persons or
their successors in interest: ( 1) The judgment
debtor; (2) a credit having a lien by judgment or
mortg-age on the property sold, or on some shHre
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the
property was sold.
(2) Redemption- How Made. At the time
of redemption the person seeking the same may
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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make payment of the amount required to the
person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to the officer who made the
sale, or his successor in office. At the same time
the redemptioner must produce to the officer or
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve
with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy
of the docket of the judgment under which he
c}aims the right rto redeem, or, if he redeems
upon a mortgage ·Or other lien, a memorandum of
the record thereof certifie:d by the recorder; (2)
an assignment, properly aclmowledged or proved,
whe·re the same is necessary to establish his
claim; (3) .an affidavit by himself or his agent
showing the amount then actually due on the lien.
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid.
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying the amount of his purchase with 6 per cent
thereon in addition, together with the amount
of any assessment or taxes, and .any reasonable
sum for fire insurance and necessary m~ainten
ance, upkeep, or rep·air of any improvements
upon the property which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after the purchase, with interest
on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a
creditor having a lien prior to that of the person
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which s1aid purchase was made, the amount
of such lien, with interest.
( 5) Where no Redemption is !fade. If no
redemption is 1nade within six months after the
sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to
.a conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty
days h·ave elapsed and no other redemption by
a creditor has been made and notice thereof has
been given, the }ast redemp·tioner, or his assignee,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of
six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor
redeems, he must make the same payments as
are required to effect a rede.mpti10n by a creditor.
If the debtor redeems, the effect of the s:ale is
terminated and he is restored to his estate. * * * "
Many states have similar provisions, and the California provisions are almost exactly verbatim to ours.
Inasmuch as all the questions raised by appellant have
been discussed by the California Courts under their
statute, the pertinent portion of it is set forth here:
"California Code of Civil Procedure; Section 701 :

Redemption; Persons Entitled To; Redemptions
Defined.
Property sold subject to redemption, as provided in the last seetion, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons, or their
successors in interest:
1. The judgment debtor, or his successor
in intere~st, in the whole or any part of the property;
2. A creditor having a lien of judgment or
mortgage on the property sold, or on some share
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the
property was sold. The persons mentioned in
the second subdivision of thi's section are, in this
Chapter termed redemptioners."
It should
there are two
the judgment
having a lien

be noted that both in Ut~ah and California
types of redemptions: (1) redemption by
debtor, and (2) redemption by "a creditor
by judgment or mortgage on the property

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sold, or some share or part thereof, subsequent to that
on which the property was ·sold." Persons of the second
group are ealled "redemptioners." A careful distinction
is necessary between the two types because of thB difference in the effect of their redemption.
When. a ju·dgment debtor redeems, the effect of the
foreclosure s.ale is terminated, and he is restored to
his former e1state. This may, as in the ease at bar, have
the disadvantage of restoring judgment liens previously
cleared off the prop·erty by the foreclosure sale.
When a "redemptioner" redeems, he takes the property subject to redemption from him by the judgment
debtor or by other lien or mortgage creditors. The
redemti:oner takes his title from the "purch·aser" at
the sheriff's sale .and gets no more and no less than
the "purchaser" had. (This proposition is in issue and
will be substantiated later on.)
The appellant urges th,at Reichert has, in effect,
"redeemed" the property from the sheriff's sale, and,
because he later got a deed from the mortgage debtors,
the Lawlers, his "redemption" terminates the effect of
the sale just as if the judgment debtors h·ad redeemed as
provided by statute. If this position were given credence
by this Court, grave repercussions would be felt in the
law of titles and 1nore problems 'vould arise than would
be settled.
The appellants argu1nent overlooks these facts:

1. The ste·ps necessary to effect a reden1ption are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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carefully prescribed by statute, so that everyone may
know with certainty when a redemption ha;s occurred.
2. None of the appellants redeemed as provided
by statute. The Lawlers never attempted to, and Reichert specifically and intentionally, ~and on the cle·ar advise
of his counsel, did not redeem. (See Stipulation 25,
R. 65 and 66).
3. There is a great difference, cle~arly recognized
by appellant's eounsel at the time he advised Reichert,
between an assignment and a redemption, particul~arly
where the judgment ·debtor or his successor is co~cerned.
4. The purchaser at a sheriff's sale, or, as in this
case, his assignee, may not, by the simple expedient of
getting a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed judgment
debtor, cut off the s~t~atutory rights of lien creditors to
redeem.
VVhat happened was this. After the sheriff's s~ale
Reichert had the right to ~edeem as a judgment lien
creditors of the Lawlers, but he was fifth in line, behind
Paul Clowes, Idaho Grange Wholesale, the U. S. Government and the State of Utah. The Lawlers, or their
assigns, couldn't redeem because if they did they would
restore the outstanding liens in the amount of $7,571.47
as first liens on the property, with the mortgage that
had been prior to the liens satisfied by the sale and
redemption.
If Reichert took an "assignment" of the certificate
o.f sale from P~acific N'ational, the judgment liens
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wouldn't be restored on the property-so long as he got
the assignment before he succeeded to the interest of
the L~awlers. So, that is what he did. As Stipulation 25
shows, when he made the arrangement to buy Pacific
National's interest, John Lowe, attorney for Pacific
National, thought he had in mind redeeming, and prepared the papers accordingly. However, just before
the papers were filed, Reichert called Judge Hansen, his
attorney, to be sure the papers were in order. Judge
Hansen specifically said, "It is the assignment we want,
W~alter, not the redemption." So they started all over
'again and made out an assignment. Nothing could be
clearer than the evidence in this case that Reichert
intended not to redeem. On the day following the assignment, Reichert solidified his position by purchasing a
quit-claim de.ed from the Lawlers, including their homestead interest, if any they had.
Now, because a subsequent lien creditor exercised
his right to redeem the property from Reichert, he
(Reichert) seeks to twist his actions into the "equivalent of redemption by the judgment debtor." Apparently
the restorat~on of the judgment liens in retrospect
appears to be a les~ser evil th~an it did in prospect.
Especially since there is no law ·on whether the judgment liens of other creditors are revived in a situation
which is sp·ecifically not a redemption by the judgment
debtor, but is "its equiv.alent."
The statute terminating the effect of a foreclosure
sale in case of redemption by the judgmen·t debtor is
silent as to "equiV~alents." But, 'vhen read as a whole,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the statute is eloquently clear. Rule 69 (f) (2) provides
that a person redeeming must do four things in addition
to paying the correct amount of money:
1. Prep are and serve on the officer or person from
whom he seeks to redeem a notice that he is redeeming.
1

2. Serve with his notice a certified copy of the
docket of the judgment undeT which he claims the right
to redeem. In case of a judgment debtor like the Lawlers
that would be a copy of the docket of the judgment of
foreclosure, showing them to be the "judgment debtors,"
as the term is used in Rule 69 (f) (1) fixing the persons
who may redeem. In the case ·of a judgment lien creditor
like Reichert, a certified copy of the docket of the judgment under which he acquired his judgment lien.
3. Serve with hi~s notice a copy of his assignment
properly .acknowledged ~and proved. If Reichert had
sought t_o redeem as the Hssignee of the Lawlers (which
he couldn't have done since he didn't get his deed from
the Lawlers until the day after his "equivalent of rede.mption") he would have to furnish this document. If he
sought to redeem under hi~s own judgment lien he would
not.
4. Serve with his notice an affidavit of himself or
his agent showing the amount then actually due on his
lien. This would apply only when ~a person other than
the judgment debtor redeemed.
The statute excludes "equivalents of redemption
by a judgment debtor" by making so cert'ain and specific
the requirementis for redemption that there can be no
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uncertainty as to whether there has been a redemption,
and, if so, under whose rights the redemption has been
made. This is so that other lien creditors can tell
whether their lien -has been restored, or whether they
must exercise their right of redemption in order to avoid
losing forever their rights to recover on their judgment
through the particular property involved. It is also
to protect the judgment debtor, in the event he wants to
redeem after someone else has redeemed. Because of ·
the documents which must be prepared and served, he
knows exactly from whom he must redeem and what he
must p·ay.
Great havoc would 'be wreaked in the law of titles
if this court w·ere to hold, as appellant requests, that
the assignee of the purch(~ser at the sheriff's 'sale can,
by thereafter and within the six month redemption
period getting a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed
mortgagors, terminate the effect of the foreclosure sale
just as if the judgment debtor had redeemed. To so hold
would require a holding that the effect was the same
whether or not the ·assignee intended to terminate the
sale and restore the prior liens. To so hold in this case
would require a holding that it had the effect of terminating the sale and restoring the liens even when the
assignee intended the transaction not to have the effect
of redemption. And all purchasers at sheriff's sale, and
their assigns and perhaps redemptioners, ,,. .ho later on,
but within the six months, have protected their position
by purchasing a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed
mortgagors, will be held to have involuntarily restored
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all the liens of persons who did not redeem. There are
many cases where such deeds were obtained out of an
abundance of caution.
If this court adopts the position of appell ant on this
point all titles which have passed through sheriff's sales
in the last eight years (or more) will have to be reexamined and many will be thrown into utter confusion.
1

When Reichert took the .assignment from Pacific
National, he received the whole title sold by the Sheriff,
which was all the right, title and interest of both W. C.
and Laura M. Lawler, free from liens, but subject to
redemption. When he thereafter obtained a quit-cl~aim
deed from the Lawlers, he protected himself from redemption by them and, therefore, from a restoration of
the other judgment liens, and that is what he intended
to do.
However, because there was included in the deed
all the homestead of Lawlers, he claims that, even if he
:fails on this point, T1anner must pay him an .additional
$3,650.00 in order for his claimed redemption to be valid.
As shown under the next point, that position, too, cannot withstand analysis.
POINT II
WHEN EARL D. TANNER REDEEMED THE PROPERTY FROM WALTER H. REICHERT HE R,ECEIVED ALL
THE RIGHTS THAT PA·CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED
AS PURCHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND N:OTHING MORE, AND THEREFORE HE RECEIVED THE TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM HOMESTEAD, BUT
·SUBJECT ·TO REDEMPTION BY OTHER LIEN CREDITORS.
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The discussion under this point, deals with the
arguments raised by appellant under his Points 3 and
4. Under those points appellant urges (1) Tanner, if
he is to validly redeem from Reichert, must pay him
the sum of $3,650.00 in ·addition to the amount already
paid, for the reason that Reichert is the owner of the
homestead interest of the Lawlers in this property, and
(2) that Tanner has acquired none of the undivided onehalf interest of L.aura M. Lawler in the property, for
the reason that the Clowes judgment, under which Tanner redeemed, was against W. C. Lawler only. These
points are joined here because if respondent's argument
is sound it disposes of both contentions.
The pertinent facts are these: the deed under which
the Lawlers got the property passed title to them as
joint tenants, the mortgage to Pacific National was sign·ed by both the Lawlers as mortgagors, the action to
foreclose the mortgage was against both the Lawlers,
inter alia, and both the Lawlers filed an Answer in the
foreclosure suit. The judgment of Paul Clowes under
which Tanner redeemed "~as against W. C. Lawler only
and was, therefore, a lien on only his undivided one-half
interest. Neither of the Lawlers set up any claim to a
homestead in the property in their Answer in the foreclosure suit, and neither of them filed a Declaration of
Ho1nestead until Dece1nber 29, 1955, five months and
twenty four days after the prop·erty "T.as sold at sheriff's
sale.
If Pacific N~ational, the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, took the property free from homeste~ad and if a
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redemptioner t~akes his title from the purchaser at the
sheriff's sale, the appellant must f.ail on both Point 3
and Point 4, because Tanner would have received, by
redemption, the title of Pacific National, which was
the whole of the title of both Lawlers, free from homestead.
How does one acquire a homestead interest~ Prior
to 1947, when the eases cited by appellant were decided,
there was no statutory method for selecting a homestead
and one could select it even after· execution sale. On
the theory that it is well to have certainty in titles,
Judge David T. Lewis, then a legislator, introduced
the bill which became Sec. 38-0-10, U. C. A., 1943, and
is now Sec. 28-1-10, U. C. A., 1953. As passed, it was
entitled "An Act Amending Section 38-0-10, U. C. A.,
1943, Relating to Homesteads and Providing for the
Selection and Claiming Thereof by Declaration o.f Homestead Before Execution or Judicial Sale" and provides
as follows:
"28-1-10. Declaration of homestead-Procedure-Delivery and service of-Title of purchaser at sale.-The Homestead must be selected
and claimed by the homestead claimant by making, signing and acknowledging a declaration of
homeste.ad as provided in section 28-1-11, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which declaration must,
before the time stated in the notice of sale on
execution, or on other judicial sale, as the time
of sale, of premises in which the homestead is
claimed, be delivered to and served upon the
sheriff or other officer conducting the sale or
recorded as provided in section 28-1-12, Utah
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Code Annotated 1953. If no such claim is filed or
served as herein provided, title shall pass to the
purchaser at such sale free and clear of all homestead rights. (Italics added.)
The Constitution of Utah, Article 22, Sec. 1, provides that the Legi'slature shall provide by law for the
selection by each head of a family an exemption of a
homestead. The Legislature, following the dictates of
the Constitution that it provide for the selection of a
homestead, did so. It provided that a man could claim
a homestead, free from execution or sale, up to the time
his "title" was converted into a "right of redemption",
i. e., up to the moment of Sheriff's sale. Plaintiff believes
the intention of the Legislature was to remove uncertainty in titles and to set up a method of determining
whether any homestead was claimed in a given parcel
of land. The Constitution required the Legislature to
provide for a selection of a homestead and it is plaintiff's belief that it is self evident that a provis~on requiring a person to make a written selection of homestead
so that all may know whether a hon1estead is claimed
is both constitutional 'and wise.
The L.awlers did not declare a ho1nestead by the
time set for the Sheriff's sale, that is, 12 :00 o'clock noon
on July 5, 1955, ·and they have never since had any right
to do so. For that re~a:son the property passed to Pacific
N~ati~onal free of homeste~ad ·and thereafter to Reichert
free of homestead and to Tanner free of homeste.ad.
Appellants clain1 that Sec. 28-1-10 is uncertain as
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to the time for selection of a homestead. A simple rereading of the statute shows that a Declaration of Homestead may be made and filed or sHrved at any time up
to the hour designated in the Sheriff's Notice of Sale
as the hour when the sale is to take place. Nothing
could be more clHar and certain.
Appellants further claim that for ·the Lawlers to
claim a homestead in the foreclosure proceedings would
have been a useless act and therefore they should not
be pre·judiced by their failure so to do. Unless a mortgagor who is being foreclosed is so gifted as to know,
several months in advance of the sale, that his property
will not bring, on sheriff's sale, a price greater than the
amount of the mortgagee's claim, he cannot possibly
tell whether claiming .a home·ste3;d in his Answer is a
useless act. Since trained attorneys are not so gifted,
it would be extraordinary to attribute such prescience
to the Lawlers.
Since neither of the Lawlers had filed a Declaration
of Homestead withi~ the time prescribed by statute,
Pacific N ation.al received from the Sheriff at the Sheriff's sule, the right, title and interest of the Lawle·rs,
free from homestead. But, the appellant argues, Tanner
is not the "purchaser" and does not partake of the
benefit of Sec. 28-1-10. The answer is that Tanner stands
exactly in the shoes of the "purchaser", having all the
purch-aser's right, title· and interest, and no more or no
less.
By operation of law a redemption by a redemptioner
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is the equivalent of an assignment of a sheriff's certificate of sale and the redemptioner stands in the shoes
of the "p11;rchaser" at sheriff's sale. This rule is S()
univers.ally adhered to by the courts of states having
statutes such as ours -as to be beyond que-stioning. Further, the rule h~as been specifically adopted in Utah by
this Court in Dupee vs. Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust
Company, (1899) 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845, 77 Am. St. Rep.
902, as follows :

"By redeeming, the respondent became, by
operation of law, the assignee of the purchaser
and succeeded to his rights and no more." (Italics
added)
The text writers in discussing redemption as a basis
of title state the law as follows:
American Law of Property,_,...olume 4 Section
18.66 b.:
"Redemption as a Basis of Title:
Redemption from either .a ministerial or a
judicial sale is a method of satisfying encumbrances when made by an owner, and is a method
of transferring ti tie or a prospect of title when
made by a junior lienor or by anyone else who
is entitled to be subrogated.
The latter type of redenzption effects an
assignment of the rights of the original purchaser
and the redemption is 'vithin the tenns of the
recording action to the sru11e extent as though he
had tal\:en -an express assignment. ,,..alidity of
the transfer is to be judged by checking the redeeming party's rights under the statute to make
redemption, or by ascertaining tl1at the redemptionee has accepted the redemption monies."
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The case law on the point is clear, unequivocal and
directly in point. It was established prior to 1880 under
a statute essentially the same as ours.
The law on this point has been annotated at 135 ALR
196 under an annotation entitled "Creditor or encumbrancer redeeming from mortgage sale as acquiring title
and rights of sale purchase~." The Utah case above is
referred to as illustrating the following general rule:
"Under most statutes, a creditor or junior
encumbrancer who redeems from a mortgage sale
succeeds to the title and rights of the mortgagesale purchaser."
There is an excellent and complete 1954 annotation
covering most of the points in dispute in this law suit
in Cal. Jur. 2d, Executions, Sections 200 et seq. The
effect of a redemption by a "redemptioner" (by definition a creditor of the mortgage debtor) is set forth in
Section 219 thereof·as follows:
"Section 219. Effect of redemption by creditor of debtor-When property is redeemed from
an execution sale by a redemptioner, the execution
sale is not effected, and the redemption operates
to transfer the rights of the purchaser at the sale
as evidenced by the ceTtificate of sale. When the
time for further redemption has expired, the
Sheriff's deed is made to the final redemptioner
instead of the original purchaser, and he succeeds to the title of the original purchase·r at
the execution sale·."
The Supreme Court of California des-cribes the
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effect of such a transaction in McNutt vs. Nuevo Land
Company, 167 Cal. 459, 140 P. 6, as follows:
"The so-called redemption by a junior encumbrancer is not in strict logic a · redemption,
but is rather. a purchase of the rights and title
acquired by the purchaser at the prior sale."
Applying the law set forth above to this case, we
get the following results:
1. Pacific National purchased the property in dispute at Sheriff's sale and received the title of both
foreclosed joint tenants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M.
Lawler, and by virtue of Sec. 28~1-10, took title free from
homestead. As is the case in all judicial sales of real
property, the title was subject to redemption.
2. Reichert bought Pacific National's title, took an
assignment of the certificate of sale, and stood exactly
in Pacific National's shoes.
3.. Tanner redeemed and by operation of law received Pacific National's title, through Reichert, just as if
Tanner had been a voluntary assignee.
4. Tanner's title is free from homestead.
POINT III
THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER HAVING
BEEN SOLD BY THE SHERIFF TO PACIFIC NATIONAL
AT THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND EARL
D. TANNER HAVING SUCCEEDED ~To THE TITLE OF
PACIFIC NATIONAL, THE SHERIFF WAS REQUIRED BY
LAW TO CONVEY THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER
TO EARL D. TANNER.
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The Appellants argue that a redemptioner whose
right to redeem results from a judgment lien :against one
of two joint tenants may not, by exercising his right
to redeem, obtain any title as against the other co-tenant.
This is the gist of their argument under Point Four and
the conclusion appellants draw is that, even if T.anner's
redemption were valid, he would receive only the title
of .W. C. Lawler and the undivided one-half interest of
Laura M. Lawler would return to her, presumably having reverted from Pacific National or Reichert at the
time of T1anner's redemption. This ,argument was placed
before the Supreme Court of California in 1880 under
a statute almost exactly like our and was rejected. See
Eldridge vs. Wright, 55 Cal. 531, 6 P. C. L. J. 724 which
holds- as follows :
"Where land sold under judgment is embraced in one sale, a redemptioner, having a
lien upon a sh.are or part of the land sold, can
only redeem by paying the whole of the purchase
money or redeeming the whole of the land; and
in such cases he succeeds to the whole interest
of the purchaser, and accordingly, where land
was sold under a judgment of foreclosure against
tenants in common, and redeemed by a judgment
creditor of one of the tenants, who in due course
received the deed, the redemption took the interest of both tenants."
A creditor having a lien on only a part of the
property sold, has the right to redeem by statute. Rule
69 (f) (1), U.R.C.P. says that "a creditor having a lien
by judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or some
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share or part thereof" may redeem. California has the
same provision.
There have been later cases in California dealing
with the subject and the result of those cases is set
forth in the annotation at 19 Cal. Jur. 2d referred to
above as follows :
"Prop·erties sold as a single lot or parcel
must be redeemed as a whole; it cannot be redeemed piece meal. For example, where the sale
is of the interest of all joint owners, the interest
of one of the joint owners cannot be redeemed
separately from the others ; and one who succeeds
to a p'art of the total interest sold must redeem
the whole or not at all." (19 Cal. Jur. 2d 640, 641)
"Section 207.-Creditor of Co-tenant-If real
property held in joint ownership is sold at execution sale, a creditor having a lien on the undivided
interest of one co-tenant may redeem the whole,
but has no right to redeem only the undivided
interest of his de btor. In case of such redemption, the redemptioner owes no duties to the cotenants of his debtor, and app,arantly, cannot
assert any right of contribution as to that."
1

As can be seen from the above authorities, not
only did T:anner receive the ''""hole interest of both W. C.
and Laura M. Lawler, but, in addition, it would have
been impossible for him to obtain by redemption the
undivided interest of either of them. The effect of Tanner's redemption was to pass to him the whole inter~st
of both the Lawler's, free from homestead, but subject
to redemption. There was no subsequent redemption.
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POINT IV
NO CREDITORS HAVING REDEEMED THE PROPERTY
FROM THE REDEMPTIONER EARL D. 'TANNER, HE WAS
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SHERIFF'S DEED SIX
MONTHS AFTER THE SHERIFF'S SALE.

Point Two of the appellant's brief is devoted to
the proposition that the Sheriff was without ,authority
to give a, Sheriff's deed to Tanner on January 6, 1956,
for the reason that, although six months had expired
from the date of the Sheriff's sale, sixty days had not
expired from the time of the last redemption. Tanner
having redeemed on Deeember 29, 1955. They point out
that under respondents' view of the law, ·a redemptioner
may redeem on the last day of the six month period and
thus prevent a subsequent redemption, and urge that
this would be unfair. That it is not unfair is apparent.
Any person who has a right to be a "subsequent redemptioner" has had the full six month period in which to be
an "original redemptioner" if he had a bona fide desire
to redeem. Any redemptioner may redeem by p·aying
the purchaser at Sheriff's sale his bid price plus 6 percent
If he waits for an intervening redemptioner to redeem
he must pay the bid price plus 6 percent plus an additional 3 percent and plus the other redemptioner's lien.
If he waits the whole six months to redeem it can hardly
be called unfair to him that another may redeem on the
last day.
Rule 69 (f) ( 4) provides for subsequent redemptions and states that "any other creditor having a right
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tion and within six months after the sale" redeem the
property from the last redemptioner. This clearly limits
subsequent redemptions to a time which is never beyond
six months from the date of the sheriff's sale and may
be even earlier, since it may also never be more than
sixty days after the last redemption.
If this interp.ret,ation is sound, it would not matter
even if the Sheriff had given Tanner a Sheriff's deed
pre-maturely, because the time for subsequent redemptions had expired.
Of overriding significance in relation to this point,
however, is the fact that no other creditor has sought
to redeem from Tanner either within the six month
period or within the six month period plus sixty days.
Neither of the appellants have offered or attempted to
redeem from Tanner at any time, nor tenderd to him or
to the Sheriff for him the documents necessary to redemption or the money necessary to a suecessive redemption. The time in which such a successive redemption
from Tanner could have been made under even the most
liberal interpretation having long since passed and no
redemption having been attempted or tendered, the
question of whether the redemption period expired at the
termination of six months or at the termination of sixty
days after Tanner''S redemption is moot.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PRO·PERLY ENTERED A MONEY
JUDGMEN'T AGAINST WALTER H. REI\CHERT.

Point Five of appellant's brief questions the entry
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of a money judgment against 'Valter Reichert, the
intervener below. The claim is made that he was not
in .actual possession of the premises and that he had
no notice to quit.
The facts in this regard are before this Court, as
they were before the Court below, upon stipul,at~on of
all parties, a stipulation presumably setting forth all
facts, ultimate as well as evidentiary, that any party
expected to rely on in this action. The portions of that
stipulation pertinent to this point are Stipulations 19,
20 .and 21, (R~ 62-3) as follows:
19. Since December 29, 1955, the intervener
has had possession of the above described premises by and through the defendants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler, who claimed .and still
cl~aim to be the tenants of the intervener, and
the intervener refused and refuses to surrender
the possession of said premises to the plaintiff.
20. On or about January 19, 1956, plaintiff
gave defendants notice to quit, requiring defendants to vaeate the above described premises
within seven days from the service of said notice,
and had the same served in the manner provided
by law.

21. More than seven days have elapsed since
the service of such notice, and the defendants
have failed and refused to quit the above described pre·mises 'and surrender the same to plaintiff.
The stipulation was entered into after Reichert
had, upon his own motion become a defendant and raises
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ert, apparently intended to rely below on his title· and
not on any question of notice, and for that reason
stipulated that "plaintiff gave defendants notice to
quit." Under those circumstances, Reichert should not
now be allowed to raise the point.
This action was commenced against the Lawlers
only, since the plaintiff was not aware that Reichert was
the real party behind their refus~al to deliver up his
property. On February 4, 1956, the Lawlers answered
the Complaint saying {R-10):
"6. ***these answering defendants allege
that they are lawfully in the possession of the
premises described in plaintiff's Complaint as
tenants of Walter H. Reichert, the owner of
such premises."
Thereafter, on February 10, 1956, Reichert asked
leave to intervene and become a party defendant to this
unlawful detainer action on the following grounds,
(R-12):
"That the appellant (Reichert) claims to be
the owner and entitled to the possession of the
tract of land described in plaintiff's Complaint,
subject only to the rights of the Defendants,
Lawlers, to the possession thereof as tenants of
the applicant."
Permission being granted, Reichert filed his Answer as a defendant and his ~hird party complaint
against the Sheriff. When issue ,v,as joined all round,
the fact was stipulated as set forth above to the effect
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,•

ises and that he was exercising his possession through
the Lawlers. (Stipulation 19, R. 62).
The law in this situation is clearly prescribed by
Section 78-36-'7, U.C.A. 1953 as follows: (Italics added.)
"78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.-No
person other than the tenant of the premises, and
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation
of the premises when the action. is commenced,
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff
be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person
who might have been made a party defendant;
but when it appears that any of the parties served
with process or appearing in the proceedings are
guilty, judgment must be rendered against them.

***"
As is seen from the above statute, the court having
found that Reichert who was "one of the parties appearing in the proceedings" was guilty of unlawful detainer,
the court was required by statute to render judgment
against him.
What kind of judgment~ Section 78-36-10 answers
that question in detail, providing that judgment shall
be entered for restitution of the premises as well as rent
and three times any damages caused by the unlawful
detainer. The treble damage provision is mandatory
and not permissive, as held by this court in Forrester
vs. Cook, 77 U. 137, 155, 292 P. 206.
It would appear from reading Section 78-36-7 that
entry of such a money judgment against Reichert, since
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he is a party voluntarily appearing in the action and
a party found guilty of unlawful detainer, is also mandatory. Any other interpretation would simply be
requiring the Court to waste time re-trying the same
issues on the same facts in another action.

POINT VI
THIS ·COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT
BELOW AND, IN ADDITION, DIRECT 'THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD
WALTER H. REICHERT AND THE LAWLERS HAVE CONTINUED TO UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE PROPERTY
SINCE THE JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION.

The trial court found the ultimate facts in favor
of the plaintiff (R. 78 and 79) and concluded from those
facts (R. 90), among other things, as follows:
"4. Since January 26, 1956, the defendants,
W. C. Lawler, Laura M. Lawler and Walter H.
Reichert have unlawfully detained said propery
and are now unlawfully detaining the same from
the possession of the plaintiff.
5. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
the defendants and each of them for unpaid rentals in the amount of $90.00, for damages in the
amount of $500.00, being the actual dam'ages of
$167.67 trebled, and for his costs and disbursements herein."
The judgment as to damages was based on the finding, pursuant to stipulation, that the fair rental value
of the premises is $100.00 per month. ·This Court has
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imum of darn'ages for unlawful withholding. Forrester
vs. Cook, supra, point 15 of the decision:
"While damages may not be restricted to the
rental value and may include more, yet the rental
value during the unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of damages." (Italics added)
On March 26, 1956, in conjunction with his Notice
of Appeal, Reichert filed a cost bond in the amount of
$300.00, in addition to a "Supersedeas Bond on Appeal"
(R. 96), undertaking to stay execution on the trial
court's judgment pending the appeal. The bond speciically undertakes to p~ay "damages for delay" in the
event the judgment is affirmed. The amount of the
supersedeas bond is $1,000.00 and the plaintiff, in the
belief, right or wrong, that the defendant Reichert is
a man of substantial means, has made no objection to
the amount, on the theory that, regardless of bond, s~aid
defendant has the capacity to respond in damages 1n
whatever amount may be awarded in this action.
The filing of the supersedeas bond stays the execution of the money judgment and the judgment of restitution. The court having found, per stipulation, that Reichert was in possession of the premises through the Lawlers, any attempt to oust him by ousting the pe.rsons
through whom he held possession would, in light of the
supersedeas bond, have been tortious.
It follows that, Reichert having elected to retain
possession even when adjudged to be in unlawful
detainer of the property, he must accept responsibility
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for the penalties provided by law. Penalties he could
have readily avoided by the simple expedient of surrendering possession to the plaintiff pe~ding the outcome
of this :app-eal.
As noted in Forrester vs. Cook, supra, the minimum
damages for unlawful detainer is the rental value, in
this case, $100.00 per month. As further decided in
the same case, where there is unlawful detainer, those
damages must be tripled. It follows that in the event
the judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed, this Court
should either assess additional damages at $300.00 per
month during the term of the appeal or remand the case
to the trial court to fix the same.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below and the within brief are based
on these premises, all of which the respondents believe
to be sound:
1. \Vhen Reichert purchased the assignment of the
Certificate of Sale from Pacific National, he obtained
title subject to redemption.
2. His later acquisition of a deed from the Lawlers
did not revert ·hack .and convert his receipt of an "assignment" of the certificate of sale into an involuntary
"redemption by the judgment debtor."
3. Reichert having had title subject to redemption
and Tanner having redeemed, title is in Tanner.
4. There is no outstanding homestead interest in
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Reichert for the reason that neither of the Lawlers had
made a timely Declaration of Homestead and therefore
they had no homestead to assign to him. Further, the
title Tanne·r took, being the title of the purchaser at the
sheriff's sale, was, by operation of law, free and clear
of homestead.
5. Since a redemptioner succeeds to the title of the
purchaser at the judgment sale, T.anner receivd the title
of both Lawlers when he redeemd.
6. Reichert, being guilty
. of unlawful det~ainer along
with the Lawlers, is subject to a money judgment and
triple damages.
For these reasons, respondents pray this Court for
a decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
.and assessing damages against both Reichert and the
Lawlers for the period of the ap-peal at three times the
rental value of the property withheld from the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. T'ANNER
FRANK E. MOSS
D. F. WILKINS
Attorneys for Respondents
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